Class Action Mechanisms in the Comparative Contexts: A Law and Economics Perspective by Jing-Huey Shao
1161	
ESSAY	CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	IN	THE	COMPARATIVE	CONTEXTS:	A	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS	PERSPECTIVE	
Jing-Huey	Shao*	
ABSTRACT	
Class	actions	are	designed	to	provide	claimants	a	mechanism	by	
which	 to	 enforce	 their	 rights	 with	 objectives	 including	 achieving	
access	to	justice,	being	compensated,	and	deterring	misconduct.	The	
significant	impact	of	class	disputes	on	society	brings	both	common	
law	 and	 civil	 law	 countries’	 attention	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 more	
efficient	 enforcement.	 Through	 identifying	 the	 features	 of	 class	
actions,	 this	 study	 categorizes	 class	 action	mechanisms	 into	 three	
major	 types	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 economic	 analysis:	 Common	 Law	
Type,	Civil	Law	Type	A,	and	Civil	Law	Type	B.	A	model	comprising	
transaction	cost,	risk,	and	incentive,	three	important	factors	related	
to	an	economic	analysis	of	law,	is	adopted	to	evaluate	which	type	of	
class	action	 is	more	 likely	 to	attain	the	aforementioned	objectives.	
The	results	show	that	Common	Law	and	Civil	Law	Type	B	are	the	two	
more	favorable	options	with	respect	to	class	action	designs	as	Civil	
Law	Type	A	failed	to	meet	the	objectives.	However,	since	class	actions	
reflect	 some	 public	 good	 nature,	 a	 contract	 failure	 problem	 is	
unavoidable	when	using	private	enforcement	to	pursue	public	good.	
While	 there	 is	 no	 perfect	 model,	 non-profit	 organizations	 with	
appropriate	governmental	intervention	are	suggested	as	an	option	
to	overcome	such	restraint.	
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I.	INTRODUCTION	In	 recent	 years,	 class	 action	 procedures	 have	 flourished	across	the	globe,	and	are	usually	accompanied	by	animated	debate	and	controversy.	Individuals,	non-profit	organizations,	and	public	officials	are	pursuing	remedies	for	mass	harms:	injuries	caused	by	defective	 products	 or	 pollution,	 financial	 losses	 resulting	 from	violations	of	antitrust	law,	corporate,	and	securities	law,	etc.	While	the	 United	 States	 is	 renowned	 for	 such	 mechanisms,	 other	countries	are	developing	mechanisms	for	mass	dispute	resolution	in	 the	 form	 of	 several	 variations.	 Class	 action	 or	 similar	mechanisms,	 such	 as	 representative	 action	 or	 aggregate	 action,1	are	 gradually	 being	 adopted	 by	 many	 jurisdictions.	 With	 many	variants	around	the	world,	it	is	necessary	to	determine	how	they	
 1.	 Deborah	R.	Hensler,	The	Global	Landscape	of	Collective	Litigation,	in	CLASS	ACTIONS	IN	CONTEXT:	HOW	ECONOMICS,	POLITICS	AND	CULTURE	SHAPE	COLLECTIVE	LITIGATION	3	(Deborah	R.	Hensler	et	al.	eds.,	2016).	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1163	have	 been	 performed	 and	 whether	 they	 are	 effective	 in	 a	comparative	context.	Not	surprisingly,	due	to	the	complexity	of	the	mechanisms	 and	 the	 difficulties	 in	 comparing	 distinctive	jurisdictions,	 little	 scholarly	 work	 has	 been	 done	 to	 study	 how	these	procedures	operate	in	practice.	While	 it	 is	 important	to	know	how	to	 litigate	or	defend	in	a	class	action	in	foreign	countries	as	transactions	and	business	are	more	multi-national	and	global,	transnational	litigation	adds	to	the	challenges	 presented	 by	 class	 actions	 including	 multi-state	plaintiffs	 or	 defendants.	 Knowledge	 related	 to	 different	 types	 of	class	actions	around	the	world	now	becomes	crucial.	For	instance,	courts	 encounter	 jurisdiction	 or	 enforcement	 issues	 regarding	litigation	 arising	 out	 of	 the	 same	 facts	 but	 involving	 foreign	nationals	 whose	 countries	 enforce	 different	 types	 of	 class	 or	aggregate	procedures.	The	aforementioned	issues	require	judges	to	cope	with	questions	as	to	whether	their	citizens	are	bound	by	the	 class	 judgment	 or	 settlements	 arrived	 at	 forum	 state	 or	elsewhere.2	To	address	this	issue,	US	federal	courts	have	held	that	to	 certify	 a	 class	 including	 foreign	 nationals,	 the	 court	 must	consider	whether	foreign	courts,	having	no	class	action	procedure	of	their	own,	would	enforce	US	class	action	judgments.3	Also,	it	is	common	for	jurisdictions	outside	the	United	States	to	have	courts	that	 deal	 with	 whether	 to	 recognize	 or	 to	 enforce	 US	 court	judgments,	particularly	when	 they	do	not	have	 the	same	 type	of	class	action	mechanisms	to	include	absent	plaintiffs	under	opt-out	designs.4	It	will	 undoubtedly	 be	 an	 enormous	mission	 to	 understand	each	type	of	class	action	at	the	global	level.	Hensler,	Hodges,	and	Tzankova	 have	 contributed	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 valuable	information	 and	 insights	 into	 this	 field	 from	 an	 empirical	perspective	by	collecting	national	reporters	from	several	countries	to	 establish	 basic	 distinctions.	 Also,	 there	 has	 been	 literature	covering	 topics	 as	 broad	 as	 introducing	 various	 kinds	 of	 class	action	mechanisms,	or	as	specific	as	discussing	particular	issues	in	certain	types	of	class	actions.	However,	there	has	not	been	much	
 2.	 Deborah	R.	Hensler,	The	Future	of	Mass	Litigation:	Global	Class	Actions	and	Third-
Party	Litigation	Funding,	79	GEO.	WASH.	L.	REV.	306,	310	(2011).	3.	 Id.	 at	 310.	 Linda	 Sandstrom	 Simard	 &	 Jay	 Tidmarsh,	 Foreign	 Citizens	 in	
Transnational	Class	Actions,	97	CORNELL	L.	REV.	87	(2011).	4.	Sandstrom	Simard	&	Tidmarsh,	supra	note	3,	at	87.	
1164	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	research	directly	comparing	different	systems	from	an	economic	perspective.	 Klement	 and	Weinshall-Margel	 recently	 put	 forth	 a	cost	benefit	analysis	of	class	actions	from	an	Israeli	point	of	view	and	 proposed	 an	 analytical	 framework	 for	 evaluating	 the	effectiveness	 of	 class	 actions.	 Their	 analysis	 focuses	 on	whether	class	actions	raise	overall	net	social	welfare.5	One	of	the	features	that	makes	this	Essay	distinct	from	previous	studies	is	that	it	puts	the	 emphasis	 on	 the	plaintiff	 side	 in	 analyzing	 one	 of	 the	major	problems	with	collective	actions:	access	to	justice,	since	there	has	been	 relatively	 little	 use	 of	 the	 procedure	 to	 date	 in	most	 other	countries	 outside	 the	 United	 States. 6 	Since	 there	 are	 many	participants	in	a	class	action	with	different	economic	perspectives,	plaintiffs	directly	 influence	whether	class	actions	can	 take	place,	which	implies	the	effectiveness	of	access	to	 justice.	An	economic	analysis	 would	 be	 one	 of	 the	 feasible	 ways	 to	 approach	 this	question,	especially	when	obtaining	empirical	data	worldwide	 is	difficult.	The	 main	 objectives	 of	 class	 actions	 that	 are	 generally	recognized	 include	 compensation,	 deterrence,	 and	 access	 to	justice. 7 	While	 access	 to	 justice	 is	 the	 threshold	 question	 of	compensation	and	 the	 two	are	usually	being	discussed	 together,	deterrence	is	usually	categorized	as	another	issue.	The	deterrence	effect	of	class	actions	has	been	commonly	accepted	in	the	United	States.	 Conversely,	 studies	 regarding	 the	 same	 effect	 in	 other	jurisdictions	 are	 still	 inadequate.	 This	 is	 especially	 critical	 for	jurisdictions	 that	 have	 low	 utilization	 rate	 of	 class	 actions	 and	where	tortfeasors	such	as	enterprises	may	be	under-deterred	from	their	wrongful	acts.	Through	 an	 economic	 analysis,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 determine	whether	these	class	action	mechanisms	have	met	their	set	goals,	while	at	the	same	time	minimizing	costs.	For	this	analysis,	instead	of	using	specific	countries	 for	comparison,	 the	Author	simplified	and	categorized	different	types	of	class	action	mechanisms	into	a	
 5.	 Alon	Klement	&	Keren	Weinshall-Margel,	Cost–Benefit	Analysis	of	Class	Actions:	An	
Israeli	Perspective,	172	J.	INSTITUTIONAL	&	THEORETICAL	ECON.	75,	81	(2016).	6.	 Hensler,	supra	note	2,	at	309.	7.	 Klement	&	Weinshall-Margel,	supra	note	5,	at	82.	The	objectives	of	class	actions	include:	(1)	enforcing	the	law	and	deterring	future	violations,	(2)	exercising	the	right	of	access	to	the	court,	especially	for	disadvantaged	groups	or	individuals,	and	(3)	providing	compensation	for	injured	parties.	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1165	few	major	 types	according	to	 the	 features	 identified	by	previous	studies.	 Regarding	 the	 access	 to	 justice	 and	 compensation	objectives,	by	outlining	the	parameters	for	measuring	the	costs	and	benefits	 relevant	 to	 these	 objectives,	 the	 Author	 assessed	 the	utility	for	the	principals	and	agents	in	each	type	of	class	action.	The	framework	 of	 this	 analysis	 consists	 of	 the	 consideration	 of	transaction	costs,	risk,	and	incentive	which	are	based	on	classical	microeconomic	 literature.	With	 respect	 to	 the	 deterrence	 effect,	the	Author	referred	to	the	theoretical	framework	from	punishment	literature	 and	 transform	 it	 into	 explaining	 class	 actions.	 The	aforementioned	 analyses	 are	 combined	 together	 to	 examine	 the	merits	 and	 limitations	 in	 different	 types	 of	 class	 action	mechanisms,	followed	by	discussions	and	recommendations.	
II.	LITERATURE	REVIEW	For	 many	 years	 after	 Rule	 23	 of	 US	 Federal	 Rule	 of	 Civil	Procedure	was	adopted,	the	United	States	was	not	only	the	center	of	class	action	litigation,	but	was	virtually	the	only	jurisdiction	that	permitted	 class	 actions.	 The	 opt-out	 mechanism	 in	 conjunction	with	enormous	punitive	awards	creates	a	formidable	weapon	for	plaintiffs	against	defendants	in	mass	disputes.	With	the	power	and	great	incentives	that	attract	numerous	entrepreneur	lawyers	and	plaintiffs	 to	 file	 suits	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 potential	consequences	of	such	US-style	class	actions	have	triggered	great	controversy.	First,	plaintiffs’	attorneys	in	class	actions	are	subject	to	only	minimal	monitoring	by	dispersed	clients,	which	raises	the	specter	that	the	entrepreneurial	attorneys	serve	their	own	interest	at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 client. 8 	Also,	 the	 aggregation	 of	 lawsuits	increase	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	 the	 plaintiffs,	 which	 induces	frivolous	 lawsuits	 that	 force	 the	 defendants	 to	 settle	 to	 avoid	potentially	 outrageous	 judgment	 awards.	 Some	 scholars	 believe	the	regulatory	structure	of	the	US	class	actions	is	poorly	designed	in	a	number	of	respects,	particularly	when	applied	to	“large-scale,	small-claim”	litigation	where	the	overall	 liability	 is	 large,	but	the	individual	 interests	of	the	class	members	are	small.9	With	such	a	
 8.	 Jonathan	R.	Macey	&	Geoffrey	P.	Miller,	The	Plaintiffs’	Attorney’s	Role	in	Class	Action	
and	Derivative	Litigation:	Economic	Analysis	and	Recommendation	For	Reform,	58	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	1,	3	(1991).	9.	 Id.	
1166	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	significant	 impact	 on	 the	 landscape	 of	 class	 dispute	 resolution,	certain	critical	concerns	still	lie	within	US	class	actions.	However,	 since	 the	 comments	 have	 turned	 against	 class	actions	in	the	United	States,	class	actions	and	other	group	litigation	procedures	 seem	 to	 have	 gained	 attention	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	world.	 Outside	 the	 United	 States,	 class	 actions	 have	 been	authorized	 in	 the	Quebec	 province	 in	 1973	 and	 spread	 to	 other	Canadian	 provinces	 in	 the	 early	 1990s. 10 	Australia	 adopted	 a	federal	class	action	rule	in	1992,	which	was	followed	by	its	states	in	 the	 late	 1990s. 11 	On	 virtually	 every	 continent,	 one	 or	 more	nations	have	adopted	some	sort	of	aggregated	or	 representative	litigation	 procedure. 12 	At	 least	 twenty-one	 of	 the	 twenty-five	largest	economies	 in	 the	world	have	adopted	some	 type	of	 class	action,	most	in	the	last	twenty	years.13	In	the	case	of	jurisdictions	that	 have	 rejected	 representative	 litigation,	 they	 also	 have	instituted	group	litigation	procedures	to	manage	mass	disputes.14	Countries	have	adopted	class	actions	diversely.	In	other	words,	the	these	procedures	vary	considerably	regarding	who	has	standing	to	sue,	 scope,	 remedies,	 and	 whether	 the	 procedure	 requires	 or	allows	class	members	to	opt	in	or	opt	out.15	These	variations	in	key	features	are	included	as	the	parameters	used	here	in	the	analysis	of	different	class	actions.	Our	 analytical	 model	 includes	 transaction	 cost,	 risk,	 and	incentive	which	 are	 three	 important	 factors	 that	 are	 commonly	used	in	microeconomics	to	evaluate	different	types	of	class	actions.	The	issue	of	transaction	cost	was	initially	raised	by	Ronald	Coase	in	 his	 articles	 “The	 Nature	 of	 the	 Firm”16 	and	 “The	 Problem	 of	Social	Cost.”17	In	Coase’s	view,	 firms	and	markets	are	alternative	governance	 structures	 that	 differ	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 transaction	costs.	Transaction	cost	is	viewed	as	the	price	mechanism	utilized	by	different	governance	structures.	Henceforth,	transaction	costs	
 10.	 Hensler,	supra	note	2,	at	306.	11.	 Id.	12.	 Hensler,	supra	note	1,	at	3.	13.	 Id.	14.	 Hensler,	supra	note	2,	at	307.	15.	 Id.	The	variations	in	key	features	are:	Standing:	(1)	public	officials;	(2)	licensed	associations;	 (3)	 private	 actors.	 Scope:	 (1)	 limited;	 (2)	 transsubstantive.	 Remedies:	 (1)	injunctive	or	declaratory;	(2)	damages.	Procedure:	(1)	opt-in;	(2)	opt-out.	16.	 R.	H.	Coase,	The	Nature	of	the	Firm,	4	ECONOMICA	(NEW	SERIES)	386	(1937).	17.	 R.	H.	Coase,	The	Problem	of	Social	Cost,	3	J.	L.	&	ECON.	1,	2	(1960).	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1167	in	this	Essay	are	referred	to	as	the	“cost	of	running	system”18	from	the	 plaintiff	 perspective.	 While	 the	 idea	 of	 “transaction	 cost”	conceptualized	 by	 Coase	 is	 the	 most	 rudimentary	 form	 of	 this	concept,	 it	has	been	successively	expounded	by	 later	economists	with	amplified	theories	and	evidence.	To	sort	out	an	unambiguous	categorization	of	the	transaction	cost	 for	comparative	studies,	 in	this	 study,	 the	 classification	 of	 transaction	 costs	 done	 by	 Carl	Dahlman	in	his	article	“The	Problem	of	Externality”	is	adopted.19	Dahlman	groups	 transaction	costs	 into	 three	 types	based	on	 the	different	phases	of	contract-making:	search	and	information	cost,	bargaining	and	decision	cost,	and	policing	and	enforcement	cost.20	Also,	 the	 Author	 refers	 to	 the	 categorization	 of	 “cost	 of	 justice,”	which	 includes	 “monetary	 cost,	 opportunity	 cost,	 and	 intangible	cost”	 proposed	 by	 Gramatikov	 et	 al. 21 	In	 a	 typical	 class	 action,	particularly	 if	 individual	 loss	 is	 small,	 but	 the	number	of	people	who	suffer	from	the	damages	and	injuries	is	large,	there	will	be	no	incentive	for	an	individual	to	initiate	a	lawsuit.	Hence,	with	respect	to	 the	aforementioned	objectives	of	 compensation	and	access	 to	justice,	 the	 threshold	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 mechanism	 can	lower	the	transaction	cost	more	than	the	benefit	it	creates,	just	as	Charles	 Silver	 believes	 that	 transaction	 cost	 is	 a	 significant	parameter	 in	determining	 collective	willingness	 to	enter	 lawsuit	procedures.22	Hence,	this	Essay	particularly	focuses	on	the	plaintiff	side	since	there	are	still	not	enough	discussions	on	the	relationship	between	claimants	and	their	attorneys	outside	the	United	States.	The	 other	 important	 factors	 utilized	 in	 this	 Essay	 are	incentive	 and	 risk.	 The	 very	 first	 person	 to	 make	 an	 incentive	analysis	of	sharecropping	was	Adam	Smith	in	1776.23	Also,	Steve	Cheung	 made	 a	 systematic	 incentive,	 risk,	 and	 transaction	 cost	analysis	of	a	contractual	arrangement	on	sharecropping	in	the	late	
 18.	 Aric	 Rindfleisch	 &	 Jan	 B.	 Heide,	 Transaction	 Cost	 Analysis:	 Past,	 Present,	 and	
Future	Applications,	61	J.	MARKETING	30,	31	(1997).	19.	 Carl	J.	Dahlman,	The	Problem	of	Externality,	22	J.	L.	&	ECON.	141	(1979).	20.	 Id.	21.	 MARTIN	GRAMATIKOV	ET	AL.,	A	HANDBOOK	FOR	MEASURING	THE	COSTS	AND	QUALITY	OF	ACCESS	TO	JUSTICE	68	(2010).	22.	 Charles	M.	Silver,	Class	Actions	–	Representative	Proceedings,	7600	ENCYCLOPEDIA	OF	L.	&	ECON.	 194	 (1999),	 https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/7600-class-actions.pdf	[https:/perma.cc/KE5F-BLWN].	23.	 See	generally	ADAM	SMITH,	THE	WEALTH	OF	NATIONS	(Edwin	Cannan	ed.,	2003)	(first	published	in	1776).	
1168	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	1960s.	 Cheung	 believes	 that	 “the	 choice	 of	 contractual	arrangement	 is	 made	 so	 as	 to	 maximize	 the	 gain	 from	 risk	dispersion	subject	to	the	constraint	of	transaction	costs.”24	While	incentive,	risk,	and	transaction	cost	are	the	three	basic	elements	of	microeconomics,	the	fact	that	law	and	economics	should	consider	them	is	usually	attributed	to	Guido	Calabresi,	who	argued	that,	for	accidents,	 there	 are	primary	 costs,	 secondary	 costs,	 and	 tertiary	costs,	which	are	believed	here	to	reflect	the	spirit	of	incentive,	risk,	and	transaction	cost,	respectively.25	The	other	objective	(deterrence)	mainly	addresses	a	problem	where	 violation	 of	 a	 legal	 duty	 results	 in	 dispersed	 harm	 to	numerous	individuals.	When	each	individual’s	loss	does	not	justify	pursuing	its	recovery	in	court,	producers	of	mass	harm	might	not	be	 sufficiently	 deterred	 from	 violating	 their	 legal	 duties.	 Class	actions	 address	 this	 problem	 by	 aggregating	 small	 individual	claims	 into	 “marketable”	 lawsuits	 by	 creating	 a	 procedural	mechanism	that	incentivizes	representing	plaintiffs	and	attorneys	to	identify	suitable	causes	of	action	and	to	litigate	them	in	court.26	One	of	the	ways	to	estimate	deterrence	value	is	by	observing	the	change	in	defendants’	behavior	in	expectation	of	being	subject	to	class	actions.	However,	such	observations	are	difficult	to	obtain.27	Hence,	 this	 Essay	 refers	 to	 the	 deterrence	 and	 punishment	literature	 as	 the	 tool	 for	 economic	 analysis.	 The	 theory	 of	punishment	 and	 deterrence	 started	 with	 Becker	 presenting	 his	idea	 about	 developing	 an	 optimal	 decision	 to	 combat	 illegal	behavior,	in	which	the	variables	are	the	probability	that	an	offense	is	discovered	and	the	size	of	the	punishment	from	the	perspective	of	 criminal	 law. 28 	This	 concept	 was	 later	 applied	 to	 civil	 law	schemes,	 where	 scholars	 believed	 that	 when	 there	 are	enforcement	errors	that	enable	injurers	to	externalize	social	cost,	punitive	damages	are	required	to	align	expected	liability	and	social	cost,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 solve	 the	 under-deterrence	 problem	 by	
 24 .	 Steven	 N.	 S.	 Cheung,	 Transaction	 Costs,	 Risk	 Aversion,	 and	 the	 Choice	 of	
Contractual	Arrangements,	12	J.	L.	&	ECON.	23,	25	(1964).		25.	 See	 generally	 GUIDO	 CALABRESI,	 THE	 COST	 OF	 ACCIDENTS:	 A	 LEGAL	 AND	 ECONOMIC	ANALYSIS	(1970).	26.	 Klement	&	Weinshall-Margel,	supra	note	5,	at	75.	27.	 Id.	at	81.	28.	 Gary	S.	Becker,	Crime	and	Punishment:	An	Economic	Approach,	 76	 J.	POL.	ECON.	169,	170	(1968).	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1169	increasing	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 sanction.29	While	 the	 enforcement	error	term	may	vary	 from	the	probability	of	escaping	 liability	 to	the	 probability	 of	 punishment,	 these	 labels	 basically	 indicate	similar	ideas	and	serve	the	same	function:	to	determine	punitive	multipliers	that	are	 intended	to	be	equal	 to	the	reciprocal	of	 the	enforcement	error.30	Through	applying	the	punitive	multipliers	to	the	 damage	 amount,	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 compare	 the	deterrence	effect	among	different	types	of	class	actions.	
III.	RESEARCH	MODELS	By	applying	a	model	consisting	of	transaction	cost,	risk,	and	incentive,	we	aim	 to	evaluate	which	 type	of	 class	action	 is	more	likely	 to	 attain	 the	 objectives	 of	 access	 to	 courts,	 compensation,	and	 deterrence.	 For	 the	 first	 two	 goals,	 the	 costs	 are	 estimated	against	 the	 benefits	 by	 separately	 outlining	 the	 parameters	 for	claimants	(principals)	and	attorneys	(agents)	since	they	may	have	different	 economic	 perspectives	 or	 conflicts	 of	 interest.	 Of	 the	functions,	all	 the	constituents	of	 the	 transaction	cost,	either	pre-litigation	or	in-litigation,	are	taken	into	account.	The	information	cost	interlinks	two	phases	of	the	litigation,	which	include	the	cost	of	 searching	 for	 an	 attorney	 (pre-litigation)	 and	 the	 cost	 of	evidence-collecting	 (during	 litigation),	 as	 well	 as	 costs	 in	association	with	other	information	collection	efforts.	Information	cost	can	also	be	broken	down	into	the	cost	for	use	of	information,	discovery	related	costs,	witness’	compensation,	experts’	fees,	and	service	 for	 summons.	 The	 bargaining	 cost	 between	 a	 client	 and	her/his	attorney	usually	takes	place	before	the	litigation	process	on	the	content	of	legal	service	agreements.	The	monitoring	cost	is	indispensable	for	the	client	to	ensure	the	subsequent	proceeding	of	 the	 lawsuit.	 As	 the	 litigation	 proceeds,	 the	 court	 fee	 contains	items	ranging	 from	 filling	 fees,	 translators’	 fees,	notary’s	 fees,	 to	copying	and	other	overheads.	Last	but	not	least,	attorney	fees	are	in	all	the	phases	and	procedures	of	the	lawsuit.	Encompassing	the	aforementioned,	 inclusive	 utility	 functions	 for	 the	 principal	(claimant)	and	the	agent	(attorney)	are	as	follows:	
 29.	 Robert	D.	Cooter,	Economic	Analysis	of	Punitive	Damages,	 S.	CAL.	L.	REV.	56,	79	(1982-1983);	Mitchell	A.	Polinsky	&	Steven	Shavell,	Punitive	Damages	Economic	Analysis,	111	HARV.	L.	REV.	869,	873	(1998).	30.	 Id.	
1170	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	(1.0)	U=B–TC	(1.1)	Up=Bp–TCp	(1.2)	Ua=Ba–TCa	U	 denotes	 the	 utility	 in	 consideration	 of	 benefit	 against	transaction	cost.	B,	TC,	p	and	a	represent	Benefit,	Transaction	Cost,	principal,	and	agent,	respectively.	Risk	and	incentive,	although	not	appearing	 in	 the	 formula	 in	 the	 basic	 function,	 are	 taken	 into	account	 when	 evaluating	 transaction	 costs	 and	 benefits,	 and	appear	in	later	various	functions.	While	the	analytic	model	is	fairly	straightforward,	the	variations	in	different	jurisdictions	make	the	constituents	of	the	function	highly	distinct	from	one	another.	As	 to	 the	 cost	 part,	 the	 Author	 also	 outline	 parameters	separately	 for	 principal	 and	 agent.	 For	 principals,	 because	claimants	 have	 to	 search	 for	 agents,	 negotiate	 with	 them,	 and	monitor	them	during	the	process,	the	basic	function	include	all	the	constituents	Dahlman	 listed.	Also,	because	the	claimants	have	to	spend	time	and	effort	in	a	general	sense,	cost	of	justice	is	included	as	well.	Litigation	costs,	which	are	illustrated	as	court	fees	here,	is	contingent	upon	whether	the	jurisdiction	adopts	American	rule	or	English	rule	(cost-shifting).	Attorney	fees	are	also	indispensable	to	the	cost	for	principals	unless	it	was	a	contingency	fee	arrangement.	Hence,	a	more	detailed	function	for	principals	can	be	broken	down	as	follows:	Transaction	cost	for	Principal=	Information	cost+	Bargaining	cost+	Monitoring	cost	+Cost	of	justice	+Court	fee+	Attorney	fee	TCp=	ICp	+	BCp	+	MCp	+CJ	+	CF	+	AF	As	for	agents,	the	constituents	taken	into	consideration	under	the	framework	are	basically	the	same	as	those	for	the	principals.	However,	the	meaning	of	each	constituent	and	the	results	are	not	the	same.	Information	cost	for	attorneys	mainly	refers	to	the	cost	during	 the	 litigation.	 Also,	 although	 there	 are	 bargaining	 costs	when	 entering	 into	 a	 legal	 service	 contract,	 there	 is	 neither	 a	monitoring	cost	from	the	attorney	side,	nor	cost	of	justice	or	court	fees	for	processing	the	cases.	Therefore,	the	function	for	the	agent	is	as	follows:	Transaction	cost	for	Agent=	Information	cost+	Bargaining	cost	TCa=	ICa	+	BCa	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1171	With	respect	to	the	benefits,	for	most	jurisdictions,	principals	are	the	ones	who	shoulder	and	care	about	the	case	results	since	they	pay	the	costs	and	receive	the	judgment	award.	In	other	words,	they	bear	the	risk	and	are	incentivized	by	the	benefit	against	the	transaction	cost.	The	expected	benefit	is	the	prevailing	rate	for	the	litigation	multiplied	by	 the	 judgment	 award,	minus	 the	 attorney	fee.	 Here,	 with	 “w”	 denoting	 the	 winning	 rate	 of	 the	 case,	 the	benefit	for	the	principal	can	be	illustrated	as	follows:	Benefit	for	Principal=	w(Judgment	award)	Bp=w(JA)	Attorneys	in	most	jurisdictions	charge	by	the	case	or	by	the	hour	regardless	of	the	case	outcome.	Therefore,	the	benefit	for	the	agent	 is	 comparatively	 simple,	 i.e.	 the	 fee	 they	 receive	 for	 their	services.	Benefit	for	Agent=Attorney	fee	Ba=AF	
IV.	TYPES	OF	CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	Although	 class	 action	mechanisms	 are	 developed	 based	 on	their	 distinct	 social	 and	 economic	 backgrounds,	 as	well	 as	 their	legal	 legacies,	 they	 follow	 a	 few	 major	 models.	 The	 Author	categorize	 them	 herein	 according	 to	 their	 features	 instead	 of	rigidly	 sorting	 them	 by	 their	 jurisdictions.	 Based	 on	 the	 critical	features	identified	in	previous	studies,	three	types	of	class	actions	are	highlighted	for	the	purpose	of	the	economic	analysis:	Common	Law	Type	(US	type),	Civil	Law	Type	A,	and	Civil	Law	Type	B,	which	we	 believe	 covers	 a	 substantial	 percentage	 of	 the	 types	 of	 class	actions.	
A.	Basic	Features	of	Common	Law	Class	Actions	Because	class	action	is	comparatively	mature	in	the	US	legal	system,	it	is	referred	to	as	a	representative	example	of	the	Common	Law	 Type.31	Rule	 23	 of	 the	 US	 Federal	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	
 31.	 Deborah	Hensler	et	al.,	The	Globalization	of	Class	Actions:	An	Overview,	622	ANN.	AM.	ACADEMY	OF	POL.	&	SOC.	SCI.	7,	10	(2009).	See	also	Amichai	Magen	&	Peretz	Segal,	The	
Globalization	 of	 Class	 Actions	 National	 Report:	 Israel,	 GLOBAL	 CLASS	 ACTION	 EXCHANGE,	http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Israel_National_Report.pdf	[https://perma.cc/KWF8-F99K]	(last	visited	Sept.	10,	2019).	
1172	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	specifies	the	main	features	of	US	class	actions.	To	qualify	as	a	class	action,	 a	 lawsuit	 must	 be	 certified	 by	 the	 court.	 After	 the	certification,	 the	 court	 appoints	 a	 class	 counsel.	 Class	 actions	involving	damage	claims	certified	under	Rule	23(b)(3)	are	subject	to	 specific	 notice	 and	 opt-out	 requirements.32	Additionally,	 Rule	23(e)	 and	 23(h)	 stipulate	 the	 court’s	 authority	 to	 review	 the	settlements	and	attorney	fees	of	class	actions.33	Beside	the	stated	procedural	features	of	US	class	actions,	the	most	influential	factor	that	motivates	 the	 initiation	 of	 class	 actions	 by	 attorneys	 is	 the	huge	financial	incentive	comprised	of	enormous	punitive	awards	and	 contingency	 fee	 arrangements	 that	 are	 prevalent	 in	 class	actions.34	
B.	Basic	Features	of	Civil	Law	Class	Actions	Most	of	the	civil	law	countries	adopt	class	action	mechanisms	by	using	opt-in	designs	to	aggregate	claimants,	with	some	minor	variations.	 This	 is	 because	 civil	 law	 countries	 still	 feel	uncomfortable	 about	 accepting	 “absent	 parties”	 to	 be	 class	members	 with	 opt-out	 designs,	 which	 is	 a	 departure	 from	 the	traditional	 civil	 procedure,	 especially	 concerning	 res	 judicata	issues.35	They	offer	significantly	less	compensation	as	compared	to	common	 law	 countries	 because	 civil	 law	 countries	 do	 not	 apply	punitive	damage	unless	the	law	specifies	that	it	is	necessary	to	do	so.	 Even	 if	 punitive	 damages	 are	 stipulated	 by	 law,	 the	 damage	amount	 is	 usually	 capped	by	 a	 certain	 fixed	 amount	or	within	 a	specific	fixed	multiplier	of	the	actual	damage.	Also,	contingency	fee	arrangements	are	prohibited	or	only	allowed	under	restrictions	in	most	 civil	 law	 countries. 36 	Besides	 the	 referenced	 common	
 32.	 See	FED.	R.	CIV.	P.	23(b)(3).	33.	 See	FED.	R.	CIV.	P.	23(e)(h).	34 .	 Wallace	 Wen-Yeu	 Wang	 &	 Chen	 Jian-Lin,	 Reforming	 China’s	 Securities	 Civil	
Actions:	Lessons	From	U.S.	PSLRA	Reform	and	Taiwan’s	Government-Sanctioned	Non-Profit,	21	COLUM.	J.	ASIAN	L.	115,	135	(2008).	35.	 Jing-Huey	 Shao,	Class	 Action	Mechanisms	 in	 Chinese	 and	Taiwanese	 Contexts–A	
mixture	of	Private	and	Public	Law,	28	EMORY	INT’L	L.	REV.	237,	279	(2014).	36.	 	 See	 Taipei	Bar	Association	Professional	 Legal	 Ethics	 art.	 35,	 TAIPEI	BAR	ASS’N,	https://www.lawbank.com.tw/treatise/lawrela.aspx?lsid=FL010136&ldate=20030907&lno=1	 [https://perma.cc/5RLX-2SWC]	 (last	 visited	 Sept.	 10,	 2019).	 Contingency	 fee	arrangements	are	prohibited	in	certain	types	of	cases.	Even	if	it	is	allowed,	the	Taipei	Bar	Association	capped	the	total	fees	that	attorneys	can	charge	per	case,	which	substantially	limits	the	revenue	of	attorneys	who	represent	class	actions.	See	also	Charter	of	the	Taipei	Bas	 Association	 art.	 29,	 TAIPEI	 BAR	 ASS’N,	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1173	features,	 the	 class	 action	mechanisms	 in	 civil	 law	 countries	 can	further	be	divided	into	two	types.	1.	Civil	Law	Type	A	The	 Civil	 Law	 Type	 A	 (“Type	 A”)	 class	 action	 mechanism	facilitates	 the	 aggregation	 of	 claimants	 by	 simplifying	 the	 filing	procedure.	 If	 the	 plaintiff	 petitions	 and	 the	 court	 considers	 it	appropriate,	 the	 court	 can	 issue	 a	 public	 notice	 for	 potential	claimants	 to	 join	 the	 lawsuit	 by	 registration	 or	 by	 some	 other	similar	means.37	Other	 than	 the	 stated	 feature,	 this	 type	of	 class	action	 is	 essentially	 identical	 to	 traditional	 joinder	 claims	 or	intervention	claims	used	for	solving	multiple-party	disputes.	2.	Civil	Law	Type	B	The	 Civil	 Law	 Type	 B	 (“Type	 B”)	 class	 action	 mechanism	confers	 non-profit	 organizations	 (“NPOs”)	 or	 government-sanctioned	non-profit	organizations	(“GSOs”),	such	as	trade	unions	or	 labor	 unions,	 to	 bring	 class	 actions	 under	 special	 laws.38	By	enjoying	 the	 advantages	 in	 terms	 of	 litigation	 specified	 by	 laws,	such	 as	 court	 fee	 discounts	 or	 exemption	 of	 securities	 for	injunctions	in	bringing	class	actions,39	the	qualified	organizations	
 http://www.rootlaw.com.tw/LawArticle.aspx?LawID=A040090030002700-0890901	[https://perma.cc/TG2H-X26S](last	visited	Sept.	10,	2019).	37.	 See	Taiwan	Code	of	Civil	Procedure	art.	44-2,	 JUDICIAL	YUAN	REPUBLIC	OF	CHINA,	
available	 at	 https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0010001	[https://perma.cc/7KZ4-GD9C]	(Litigants	whose	common	interests	have	arisen	from	the	same	transaction	or	occurrence	may	appoint	one	or	more	persons	from	themselves	to	sue	on	behalf	of	them.	The	court	may	publish	a	notice	for	other	persons	with	the	same	common	interests	to	join	such	action	within	a	designated	period	of	time).	See	also	Civil	Procedure	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(promulgated	by	the	Standing	Comm.	Nat’l	People’s	Cong.,	Apr.	9,	1991,	art.	55),	reprinted	in	THE	CIVIL	PROCEDURE	LAW	AND	COURT	RULES	OF	THE	PEOPLET’S	REPUBLIC	OF	CHINA	(Wei	Luo	ed.,	2006)	(“Where	a	case	has	numerous	litigants	but	the	exact	number	of	the	litigants	is	uncertain,	the	court	may	issue	a	public	notice	to	inform	those	interested	persons	who	are	entitled	to	the	claim	to	register	their	rights	with	the	court	within	a	designated	period	of	time”).	38.	 Public	officials	are	utilized	in	some	jurisdictions.	See	Hensler,	supra	note	1,	at	7.	However,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 simplicity,	 we	 exclude	 them	 for	 the	 analysis	 as	 they	 have	commonalities	with	GSOs.	39.	 For	 example,	Article	52	of	Taiwan	Consumer	Protection	Law	stipulates,	 “[i]f	 a	consumer	protection	group	brings	 a	 litigation	 in	 accordance	with	Article	50	 in	 its	 own	name,	the	court	fees	for	the	portion	of	the	claim	exceeding	NT$600,000	shall	be	waived.”	Consumer	Protection	Law,	art.	52	(Taiwan).		Also,	Article	53	specifies	that	the	court	fee	for	such	litigation	shall	be	exempted.	Id.	art.	53.	
1174	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	provide	a	more	convenient	means	for	potential	claimants	to	opt-in	the	class.	Although	this	type	of	mechanism	does	not	exclude	other	individuals	or	entities	from	initiating	suits,	a	qualified	organization	generally	has	a	more	advantageous	position	 to	 file	 class	actions.	Also,	 these	 NPOs	 or	 GSOs	 are	 nominally	 the	 plaintiffs	 in	 most	situations	 because	 the	 jurisdictions	 of	 this	 type	 of	 class	 actions	hold	that	this	type	of	group	has	standing	to	sue	for	mass	disputes.40	
V.	THE	ECONOMIC	ANALYSIS	OF	CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	
A.	Common	Law	Type	For	 the	 Common	 Law	 Type,	 once	 the	 court	 has	 certified	 a	class,	the	potential	claimants	who	are	included	in	the	class	simply	need	 to	 decide	 whether	 to	 opt-out	 of	 the	 class	 or	 not.41	Hence,	almost	 no	 transaction	 cost	 occurs	 in	 searching	 for	 attorneys,	joining	the	lawsuit,	or	negotiating	among	the	parties	and	with	the	agents.	Also,	 they	usually	have	enormous	size	classes	due	 to	 the	fact	 that	 the	 claimants	 have	 been	 automatically	 included	 in	 the	class, 42 	and	 where	 attorneys	 bore	 the	 relevant	 costs	 for	 them	under	 contingency	 fee	 arrangements,	which	 constitutes	 positive	incentives	for	them	to	stay	in	the	class.43	On	the	other	hand,	under	such	contingency	fee	structures,	the	attorneys	for	plaintiffs	will	generally	advance	the	expenses	of	the	class	actions	and	will	be	reimbursed	only	if	the	action	is	favorable.	Hence,	they	estimate	the	cost	and	the	expected	reward	beforehand	to	determine	 if	 the	 action	 justifies	 the	 risks	 being	undertaken.44	While	 contingency	 fee	 arrangements	 associated	 with	 punitive	awards	create	a	huge	incentive	to	motivate	lawyers	to	undertake	large	 cases,	 they	 are	 subject	 to	 very	 limited	 monitoring	 by	 the	disorganized	 clients	 (claimants).	 Hence,	 by	 bearing	 such	 a	substantial	 litigation	 risk,	 US	 type	 lawyers	 can	 exercise	 plenary	
 40.	 Antonio	Gidi,	Class	Actions	 in	Brazil	–	A	Model	 for	Civil	Law	Countries,	51	AM.	J.	COMP.	L.	311,	334,	348	(2003).	See	also	Hensler,	supra	note	1,	at	7.	41.	See	FED.	R.	CIV.	P.	23(b)(3).	42.	 Id.	43.	 Thomas	 J.	Miceli,	Do	Contingent	Fees	Promote	Excessive	Litigation?	 23	 J.	 	LEGAL	STUD.	211,	211-12	(1994).	44.	 John	C.	Coffee,	Jr.,	Reforming	the	Securities	Class	Action:	An	Essay	on	Deterrence	
and	Its	Implementation,	106	COLUM.	L.	REV.	1534,	1545-47	(2006).	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1175	control	over	important	decisions.45	The	contingency	fee	is	usually	one-third	 to	 forty	 percent	 of	 the	 judgment	 award,	 which	 is	 a	common	practice	in	the	United	States.	Here,	the	Author	denotes	“n”	as	the	contingency	fee	percentage,	“JAu”	as	the	generally	higher	US	judgment	 award,	 and	 “w”	 as	 the	 prevailing	 rate	 of	 the	 case,	 for	which	 the	 original	 functions	 for	 principals	 and	 agents	 are	 as	follows:	Benefit	for	Principal=	w(Judgment	award)	Bp=	(1–n)w(JAu)	TCp=0	Benefit	for	Agent=Attorney	fee=contingency	fee	percentage	of	the	judgment	award	Ba=AF=nw(JAu)	TCa=CF+ICa	The	 contingency	 fee	 here	 is	 considered	 the	 benefit	 for	 the	attorney,	 and	 court	 fees	 and	 other	 investigations-related	information	costs	are	assumed	by	the	agent,	so	they	are	taken	into	account	as	the	transaction	costs.	Therefore,	the	utility	function	can	further	be	illustrated	as	follows:	(2.1)	Up=(1–n)w(JAu)	(2.2)	Ua=nw(JAu)	–CF–ICa		The	 eventual	 utility	 for	 each	 claimant	will	 end	 up	 positive	since	principals	do	not	have	to	bear	costs	when	the	case	is	lost,	but	can	receive	a	share	of	the	judgment	award	if	the	case	prevails.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	case	is	lost,	all	the	costs	will	be	borne	by	the	attorneys.	 This	 makes	 it	 a	 zero-cost	 decision	 for	 the	 claimants.	Therefore,	 the	 attorneys	 will	 evaluate	 the	 benefit	 against	 the	possible	risks	and	costs	to	decide	whether	to	undertake	the	case,	and	will	reject	it	if	the	risk	does	not	justify	the	gain	against	the	cost.	Thus,	for	the	Common	Law	Type,	the	class	litigation	carries	little	risk	for	claimants	and	sets	few	barriers	for	entry,	which	effectively	enhances	 their	 willingness	 to	 claim	 compensation	 provided	 the	attorneys	are	willing	to	handle	the	case.	
 45.	 Macey	&	Miller,	supra	note	8,	at	3.	
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B.	Civil	Law	Type	A	As	 previously	 noted,	 Type	 A	 class	 actions	 are	 essentially	consensual	 group	 lawsuits	 adopting	 opt-in	 mechanisms.	 The	transaction	cost	for	joining	the	class	is	high	because	each	plaintiff	has	 to	 exert	 some	 effort	 in	 searching	 for	 attorneys	 and	 to	 be	included	 in	 the	 lawsuit.	 Additionally,	 negotiations	 among	 the	parties	 are	 required	 to	 elect	 the	 representative	plaintiff	 and	 the	class	 counsel,	 which	 also	 increases	 the	 transaction	 cost. 46	Therefore,	the	sizes	of	the	class	are	usually	small,	not	the	tens	of	thousands	of	claimants	as	which	are	often	seen	in	the	common	law	type.47	Meanwhile,	since	the	class	counsel	does	not	have	the	same	controlling	power	as	that	in	common	law	type	of	class	actions,	the	relevant	bargaining	 costs	 (BCp	&	BCa)	and	 the	monitoring	 costs	(MCp)	between	the	attorneys	and	their	clients	are	substantial,	too.	In	terms	of	incentives,	because	contingency	fee	arrangements	and	punitive	damage	awards	are	not	common	practice,	the	claimants	have	 comparatively	 low	 incentive	 to	 file	 suits	 even	 though	 the	information	cost	(ICp&	ICa)	is	usually	not	as	high	as	the	common	law	type	due	to	different	designs	in	evidence	and	civil	procedure	laws.	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 court	 fees,	 as	 most	 of	 the	 civil	 law	countries	adopt	English	rule,	where	it	is	allocated	in	the	principal’s	function	and	is	applied	when	the	case	is	lost	(1–w).48	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 while	 attorneys	 do	 not	 have	 the	 large	financial	 stakes	 incurred	 by	 the	 common	 law	 type,	 they	 receive	rewards	for	their	legal	services	without	risk	by	case	or	by	an	hourly	rate	 (AF).	 Therefore,	 the	 incentive	 for	 the	 attorneys	 is	 positive.	According	to	the	aforementioned	features,	the	utility	function	for	Type	A	can	be	elaborated	as	follows:	(3.1)	Up=Bp–TCp=w(JAv)	–ICp	–	BCp	–MCp	–CJ	–(1–w)CF	–AF	(3.2)	Ua=	AF–	ICa–BCa	Since	 principals	 are	 responsible	 for	 choosing	 the	representatives	 and	 for	 bearing	 risks	 ranging	 from	 adducing	
 46 .	 Taiwan	 Code	 of	 Civil	 Procedure,	 Art.	 44-2,	 JUDICIAL	 YUAN	 REPUBLIC	 OF	 CHINA	
available	 at	 https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0010001	[https://perma.cc/7KZ4-GD9C].	47 .	 Hensler,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 306;	 KUO-CHANG	 HUANG,	 COLLABORATIVE	 CASE	 STUDY	PROJECT	ON	GLOBAL	CLASS	ACTION	&	GROUP	LITIGATION,	Appendix	III	(2011).	48.	 Theodore	Eisenberg	&	Geoffrey	P.	Miller,	The	English	Versus	the	American	Rule	on	
Attorney	Fees:	An	Empirical	Study	of	Public	Company	Contracts,	98	CORNELL	L.	REV.	327,	327	(2013).	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1177	evidence	 to	 the	 result	 of	 the	 case,	 advancing	 all	 the	 costs	 is	 a	significantly	high	entry	requirement	for	the	claimants,	especially	when	the	prevailing	judgment	award	(JAv)	is	moderate	because	of	the	 rarely	 utilized	 punitive	 damage	 award	 and	 petite	 class	 size.	Therefore,	Type	A	class	actions	appear	to	be	a	poor	choice	for	the	claimants.	
C.	Civil	Law	Type	B	In	Civil	Law	Type	B	class	actions,	the	NPOs	or	GSOs	provide	convenient	 means	 for	 potential	 claimants	 to	 opt-in	 the	 class.	Additionally,	NPOs	or	GSOs	usually	have	standing	and	can	be	the	representative	plaintiffs	and	hire	their	own	counsel,	which	saves	the	 cost	 of	 bargaining	 and	 monitoring	 between	 claimants	 and	representatives.	Also,	because	these	NPOs	or	GSOs	are	required	to	register	with	 the	 authorities,	 this	 to	 some	 extent	warrants	 their	proficiency.	Therefore,	 the	 transaction	 costs	 for	plaintiffs	 to	 join	the	 lawsuit	 are	 lower	 compared	 to	 those	 incurred	 by	 Type	 A	(dICp&	dMCp),	as	well	as	the	bargaining	cost	between	principals	and	 agents	 (dBCp	 &	 dBCa).	 More	 importantly,	 NPOs	 or	 GSOs	usually	bear	the	relevant	costs	for	claimants	with	external	public	or	private	funding,49	which	increases	the	incentive	for	claimants	to	join	such	class	actions.	Because	the	risk	and	costs	fall	upon	NPOs	or	GSOs,	the	responsibility	that	the	claimants	must	bear	is	rather	limited.	On	the	other	hand,	while	bearing	costs,	NPOs	or	GSOs	enjoy	preferential	 treatment	 by	 the	 special	 laws	 regarding	 court	 fees	(d(1-w)CF),	and	in	some	areas,	are	even	conferred	with	power	in	obtaining	 evidences	 with	 less	 cost	 (dICa), 50 	which	 is	 similar	 to	semi-public	agencies.	Lastly,	in	most	situations,	they	do	not	claim	fees	 for	 their	 legal	 services	 according	 to	 special	 laws	 such	 as	consumer	protection	laws	or	investor	protection	laws.51	The	utility	functions	can	again	be	re-illustrated	as	follows:	
 49.	 Camille	Cameron	&	Jasminka	Kalajdzic,	Commercial	Litigation	Funding:	Ethical,	
Regulatory	and	Comparative	Perspectives,	55	CAN.	BUS.	L.	J.	1	(2014).	50.	 See	Securities	Investor	and	Future	Trader	Protection	Act	art.	34	(Taiwan).	When	the	protection	institution	files	a	lawsuit	pursuant	to	Article	28	and	applies	for	a	provisional	injunction	or	a	provisional	attachment,	 the	 court	may	rule	 security	exemption	 for	 such	action.	51 .	 Kuo-Chang	 Huang,	 Using	 Associations	 as	 a	 Vehicle	 for	 Class	 Action,	 in	 CLASS	ACTIONS	IN	CONTEXT:	HOW	ECONOMICS,	POLITICS	AND	CULTURE	SHAPE	COLLECTIVE	LITIGATION	71-72	(Deborah	R.	Hensler	et	al.	eds.,	2016).	
1178	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	(4.1)	Up=	w(JAv)	–dICp	–	dBCp	–dMCp	(4.2)	Ua=	AF*–dICa–dBCa–d(1–w)CF	*AF:	from	public	or	private	funding	The	 comparison	 of	 the	 three	 types	 of	 class	 actions	 for	principals	 and	 agents	 can	 be	 obtained	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 table	below:	Table	1:	Comparison	of	 the	utility	 functions	 among	 types	of	class	actions	
Utility		 Common	Law	 Civil	Law	Type	A	 Civil	Law	Type	B	
Principal	 (1–n)w	(JAu)	 w(JAv)–ICp	 –	 BCp	 –MCp	–CJ–(1–w)CF	–AF	 w	(JAv)	–dICp	–	dBCp	–dMCp	
Agent	 nw(JAu)	 –(1–w)	 CF	 –ICa	 AF–	ICa–BCa	 AF*–dICa–dBCa–d	 (1–w)CF	From	the	comparison,	it	 is	quite	clear	that	Civil	Law	Type	A	with	the	highest	transaction	cost	is	not	ideal	among	all	three	types	because	 it	 produces	 the	 lowest	 utility	 for	 principals	 and	 agents.	The	Type	B	class	action,	by	creating	similar	benefits,	substantially	reduces	the	entry	barrier	by	diminishing	the	transaction	costs	for	class	actions	compared	to	Type	A.	The	Common	Law	Type	and	Civil	Law	Type	B	are	comparatively	favorable	according	to	the	model,	with	 higher	 benefits	 and	 lower	 transaction	 costs	 under	 the	consideration	of	risks	and	incentives.	Also,	the	Common	Law	Type	has	more	contingencies	related	to	the	prevalence	of	the	case	and	apparently	creates	higher	incentive	and	risk,	while	Type	B	is	more	certain.	However,	they	are	still	not	perfect	models.	There	are	two	major	 concerns	 for	 the	 Common	 Law	 Type	 that	 need	 to	 be	addressed.	 First	 is	 the	 agency	 cost	 problem.	 This	 stems	 from	 a	concern	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 client	 monitoring	 might	 lead	 an	entrepreneurial	attorney	“serving	his	own	interest	at	the	expense	of	the	client.”52	There	are	several	ways	to	reduce	agency	costs,	such	as	monitoring,	bonding,	or	 ethical	obligation.53	However,	 studies	
 52.	 See	Macey	&	Miller,	supra	note	8.	53.	 Judith	 Resnik	 et	 al.,	 Individuals	 Within	 the	 Aggregate:	 Relationships,	Representation,	and	Fees,	71	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	296,	374	(1996).	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1179	have	shown	that	these	methods	may	only	have	limited	functions.54	Another	way	to	reduce	agency	costs	is	to	align	the	incentives	of	the	agent	 and	 client,	where	 fee	 arrangements	 are	 the	most	 intuitive	and	the	most	common	method.55	Nevertheless,	from	an	economic	point	of	view,	contingency	fees	do	not	provide	a	perfect	incentive	because	they	externalize	all	of	the	costs	but	generate	only	part	of	the	 benefits	 to	 the	 plaintiffs’	 attorney. 56 	It	 is	 believed	 that	 this	makes	it	likely	for	some	cases	to	settle	when	it	is	in	the	interest	of	class	 members	 to	 go	 to	 trial	 because	 the	 attorney	 can	 obtain	 a	relatively	high	 fee	by	settling	and	avoiding	 the	costs	of	 trial.57	In	terms	of	other	 fee	arrangements,	while	hourly	 fee	arrangements	also	permit	opportunists	to	incur	additional	fees,	because	they	also	encourage	 externalizing	 the	 cost	 of	 work,	 fee-for-service	arrangements	 (by	 case)	 also	 induce	 attorneys	 to	 internalize	 the	cost	 of	 additional	 time	 spent	 on	 the	 service	 and	 externalize	 the	benefits	of	doing	so.	While	similar	problems	with	the	two	types	of	fee	arrangements	can	occur	in	civil	law	jurisdictions,	the	stakes	in	Common	Law	Type	class	actions	are	generally	so	 large	that	 they	magnify	the	problem.	So	far,	there	has	not	been	a	perfect	shield	that	can	be	applied	against	the	abuses	caused	by	the	fee	arrangements.	In	fact,	common	law	countries	such	as	the	United	States	have	adopted	some	other	ways	to	reduce	the	agency	costs	problem,	one	of	 which	 is	 conferring	 the	 court	 more	 power	 in	 litigation	procedures. 58 	This	 includes	 the	 basic	 features	 of	 the	aforementioned	 common	 law	 class	 actions,	 such	 as	 class	certification,	 appointment	 of	 class	 counsel,	 and	 judicial	 review	over	 settlements	 and	 attorney	 fees.	However,	while	 the	 court	 is	given	 a	 stronger	 role	 and	 is	 entitled	 to	 encourage	 and	 advise	parties,	 its	intervention	reduces	the	benefit	brought	by	advocacy	systems. 59 	Additionally,	 judicial	 review	 may	 have	 problems	 of	inherent	 bias	 and	 uncertainty.60	In	 particular,	 US	 courts	 usually	
 54.	 Id.	55.	 Id.	at	384.	56.	 Id.	at	338.	57.	 	Andrew	Rosenfield,	An	Empirical	Test	of	Class-Action	Settlement,	5	J.	LEGAL	STUD.	113,	120	(1976).	Theodore	Eisenberg	&	Geoffrey	P.	Miller,	Attorney	Fees	 in	Class	Action	
Settlements:	An	Empirical	Study,	1	J.	EMPIRICAL	LEGAL	STUD.	27,	27-78	(2004).	58.	 See	Macey	&	Miller,	supra	note	8,	at	27.	59.	 Mathias	Dewatripont	&	Jean	Tirole,	Advocates,	107	J.	POL.	ECON.	1	(1999).	60.	 	Jonathan	R.	Macey	&	Geoffrey	P.	Miller,	Judicial	Review	of	Class	Action	Settlements	1	J.	LEGAL	ANALYSIS	167	(2009).	
1180	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	review	attorney	fees	by	using	“lodestar”	or	“percentage”	methods,	which	 are	 still	 similar	 to	 the	 hourly	 fee	 and	 contingency	 fee	arrangements. 61 	Hence,	 similar	 problems	 are	 still	 there.	 In	securities	class	disputes,	the	Private	Securities	Litigation	Reform	Act	(“PSLRA”)	was	amended	to	realign	the	interests	of	parties	by	conferring	a	greater	role	on	institutional	investors	in	litigation	in	securities	class	actions.62	However,	 the	same	rationale	cannot	be	fully	replicated	to	other	types	of	class	actions	when	there	is	usually	no	specific	plaintiff	who	has	a	comparatively	large	stake	in	other	class	litigation.	Another	problem	that	exists	in	the	Common	Law	Type	is	the	problem	 of	 frivolous	 lawsuits. 63 	Since	 aggregation	 of	 a	 lawsuit	increases	the	bargaining	power	of	the	plaintiffs,	this	turns	the	table	on	the	defendants,	and	puts	the	defendant	in	the	position	of	being	rendered	insolvent	by	a	single	trial—a	large	undiversifiable	risk.64	Additionally,	because	the	fee	award	relates	to	the	recovery	of	the	case,	attorneys	will	be	more	willing	to	go	after	large	cases	against	deep	 pocket	 defendants.	 Taking	 securities	 class	 actions	 as	 an	example,	 the	evidence	 indicates	 that	suits	 tend	 to	correlate	with	higher	 quality	 underwriters,	 which	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	quality	offerings.65	This	correlation	demonstrates	that	something	other	 than	 merit	 drives	 plaintiffs’	 attorneys. 66 	Furthermore,	empirical	studies	show	that	most	securities-fraud	class	actions	are	frivolous.67	Defendants	tend	to	reach	a	settlement	even	if	the	suits	are	unmeritorious	to	control	costs	and	maintain	positive	publicity.	This	 increases	not	only	 the	 cost	of	business,	but	also	 that	of	 the	judicial	system.	Hence,	even	though	the	Common	Law	Type	saves	transaction	costs	related	to	the	initiation	of	claims,	there	is	still	no	perfect	solution	to	the	problems	of	how	to	preserve	class	benefits	and	to	eliminate	frivolous	lawsuits.	On	the	other	hand,	although	Civil	Law	Type	B	may	mostly	be	exempt	 from	 the	 aforementioned	 problems	 associated	 with	 the	
 61.	 Judith	Resnik	et	al.,	supra	note	Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.,	at	340.	62.	 See	Wang	&	Chen,	supra	note	34,	at	141.	63.	 James	Bohn	&	Stephen	Choi,	Fraud	in	the	New-Issues	Market:	Empirical	Evidence	
on	Securities	Class	Actions,	144	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	903,	979	(1996).	64.	 See	Silver,	supra	note	22,	at	204.	65.	 Stephen	J.	Choi,	The	Evidence	on	Securities	Class	Actions,	57	VAND.	L.	REV.	1465,	1477-98	(2004).	66.	 Id.	67.	 Bohn	&	Choi,	supra	note	63.	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1181	Common	 Law	 Type,	 some	 potential	 downsides	 still	 exist.	 If	 the	initiation	of	class	actions	relies	exclusively	on	these	NPOs,	GSOs,	or	even	regulators	to	take	the	lead,	the	interests	of	the	general	public	might	 go	unprotected.68	First,	most	 of	 the	 longstanding	NPOs	or	GSOs,	although	independent,	must	operate	on	modest	donations	or	membership	 fees.69	However,	 their	primary	 tasks	 and	objectives	are	 not	 to	 fund	 protracted	 litigation,	 but	 to	 conduct	 some	 non-profit	 research	 or	 services	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 their	 members. 70	When	 resources	 are	 limited,	 they	 have	 to	 prioritize	 potential	activities,	 and	 litigation	might	not	be	 the	 choice.	The	 absence	of	class	 litigation	 undoubtedly	 curtails	 the	 effects	 of	 class	 actions,	including	access	to	justice	as	well	as	compensation.	Additionally,	in	some	situations,	there	could	be	a	conflict	of	interest	between	the	organizations	and	the	claimants	that	makes	the	NPOs	or	GSOs	“less	appropriate	as	protectors”	of	the	collective	interests	of	claimants.71	
VI.	DETERRENCE	EFFECT	In	 contrast,	 the	 US	 literature	 generally	 agrees	 that	 the	deterrence	 effect	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 goals	 of	 class	actions.72	With	the	gradual	acceptance	of	punitive	damage	awards,	with	 rigid	 and	 modest	 application,	 it	 is	 posited	 herein	 that	 the	deterrence	effect	of	class	actions	is	reflected	to	some	extent	in	the	civil	law	context.	To	determine	whether	the	class	action	mechanism	effectively	deters	wrongful	acts,	the	Author	applies	the	formula	(B=	p	*	S)	by	Becker	used	in	criminal	law	for	analyzing	the	deterrence	effect	and	apply	 it	 to	class	actions.	Assuming	that	 the	defendant	commits	a	wrongful	act,	the	apprehension	rate	“p”	represents	the	probability	of	the	plaintiffs	initiating	a	lawsuit	seeking	compensation.	Sanction	“S”	denotes	the	damage	award	that	the	court	orders	a	plaintiff	to	pay	to	the	defendant.	Lastly,	benefit	“B”	would	be	the	benefits	that	a	defendant	may	obtain	by	conducting	such	wrongful	acts.	
 68.	 Ianika	Tzankova,	Collective	redress	in	Vie	d’Or:	A	reflection	on	a	European	Cultural	
Phenomenon,	 in	CLASS	 ACTIONS	 IN	 CONTEXT:	HOW	ECONOMICS,	 POLITICS	 AND	 CULTURE	 SHAPE	COLLECTIVE	LITIGATION	128-31	(Deborah	R.	Hensler	et	al.	eds.,	2016).	69.		Id.	70.	 Id.	71.	 Id.	72.	 Myriam	Gilles	&	Gary	B.	Friedman,	Exploding	the	Class	Action	Agency	Costs	Myth:	
The	Social	Utility	of	Entrepreneurial	Lawyers,	155	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	103,	110	(2006).	
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A.	Common	Law	Type	For	 the	 common	 law	 class	 actions,	 especially	 in	 the	 United	States,	the	judgment	awards	are	relatively	large,	which	provides	a	larger	 sanction	 “S.”	 However,	 the	 apprehension	 rate	 is	 more	complicated	because	the	mechanism	will	likely	be	driven	not	only	by	the	merits	of	the	case,	but	also	by	the	allure	of	a	large	amount	of	compensation.	If	we	exclude	possible	frivolous	suits,	the	“p”	would	be	 lower	 than	 it	 should	 be	 since	 lawyers	would	 only	 undertake	cases	that	are	likely	to	reimburse	their	costs,	which	is	below	the	actual	number	of	meritorious	cases.	Therefore,	“p”	is	uncertain	in	the	common	law	context.	Additionally,	to	avoid	the	uncertainty	of	the	litigation	outcome,	defendants	are	likely	to	settle	for	a	smaller	amount	 without	 going	 to	 trial.	 These	 factors	 result	 in	 a	 more	contingent	or	even	diluted	deterrence	effect.	
B.	Civil	Law	Type	A	As	for	Type	A	class	action,	because	the	transaction	costs	are	too	high	to	create	incentives	for	the	claimants	to	initiate	the	suit,	the	 “p”	 is	 lowest	 among	 all	 types.	 Further,	 with	 less	 utilized	punitive	awards	and	fewer	aggregated	claims,	the	sanctions	“S”	in	Type	 A	 are	 much	 lower	 than	 those	 in	 the	 Common	 Law	 Type.	Hence,	the	defendants	have	no	incentive	to	correct	their	wrongful	behavior	 if	 the	 benefit	 from	 the	 violation	 is	 greater	 than	 the	sanction.	
C.	Civil	Law	Type	B	On	the	other	hand,	for	Civil	Law	Type	B,	under	the	conditions	of	 sufficient	 funding,	 NPOs	 or	 GSOs	 are	 more	 willing	 to	 pursue	cases	according	to	the	merits	of	the	case	rather	than	the	potential	costs	or	rewards	since	they	do	not	operate	for	profit.	Therefore,	the	apprehension	rate	is	higher	than	Type	A,	or	even	higher	than	the	Common	Law	Type,	at	least	in	theory.	Even	though	empirically,	the	United	States	still	holds	the	highest	number	of	class	action	cases,	the	 results	 are	 influenced	by	 factors	beyond	 the	 comprehension	rate,	 i.e.,	 a	 different	 legal	 tradition	 and	 the	 legal	 service	environment,	etc.	Although	Type	B	has	the	same	problem	with	the	comparatively	low	judgment	awards	due	to	infrequent	application	of	punitive	damage,	its	overall	deterrence	effect	is	better	than	Type	A	because	of	a	higher	apprehension	rate.	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1183	Table	2:	Comparison	of	deterrence	effects	among	types	of	class	actions		
	 The	 Common	 Law	
Type	
Civil	Law	Type	A	 Civil	Law	Type	B	
Apprehension	
rate	(p)	
	Median	(excluding	the	rate	of	frivolous	suits)	/Largely	influenced	by	S	
	Lowest	(TAC	and	INC	analyses	both	indicate	a	low	likelihood	to	initiate	the	suit)	
	High	(the	agent	is	less	likely	to	be	influenced	by	private	interests)	
Sanction	(S)	 	High	 	Low		 	Low		In	 conclusion,	 with	 the	 low	 sanction	 and	 the	 lowest	apprehension	rate,	Type	A	class	actions	have	failed	to	achieve	the	objective	 of	 deterrence.	 In	 contrast,	 the	Common	Law	Type	 and	Civil	Law	Type	B,	with	higher	apprehension	rates,	appear	to	be	the	two	better	 choices	 for	 the	deterrence	objective.	However,	which	one	is	more	cost	efficient,	and	which	one	is	better	for	 improving	behavior?	While	the	Common	Law	Type	has	higher	compensation	but	a	lower	and	more	unpredictable	apprehension	rate,	Civil	Law	Type	B	has	 lower	compensation	but	a	higher	apprehension	rate.	The	 formula	 shows	 that	 enforcement	 effort	 (apprehension	 rate)	and	 sanctions	 are	 substitutes,	 meaning	 a	 lower	 level	 of	enforcement	 effort	 can	 be	 offset	 by	 increasing	 sanctions,	 which	economizes	 enforcement	 costs. 73 	Therefore,	 the	 Common	 Law	Type	 saves	more	 enforcement	 costs	 if	 not	 considering	 the	 costs	wasted	 on	 frivolous	 claims.	 However,	 scholars	 argue	 that	 when	individuals	observe	this	probability	with	some	random	error,	for	example,	like	the	uncertain	“p”	in	the	Common	Law	Type,	it	may	be	optimal	to	employ	less	than	the	maximum	feasible	sanction	with	a	greater	 probability	 of	 apprehension. 74 	While	 raising	 the	probability	 is	 costly,	 it	 may	 improve	 behavior. 75 	Therefore,	because	Civil	Law	Type	B	is	more	ascertainable	with	regards	to	the	“p”	 and	 “S,”	 it	 is	 less	 risky	 and	 is	 more	 suitable	 for	 improving	behavior	even	though	the	cost	is	higher.	
 73.	 Becker,	supra	note	28,	at	169.	74.	 Lucian	Arye	Bebchuk	&	Louis	Kaplow,	Optimal	Sanctions	when	 IndividualsaAre	
Imperfectly	 Informed	 about	 the	 Probability	 of	 Apprehension,	 21	 J.	 LEGAL	 STUD.	 365,	 368	(1992).	75.	 Id.	
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VII.	CONCLUSIONS	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS	
A.	Market/Contract	Failure	From	 the	 foregoing	 economic	 analysis,	 Civil	 Law	 Type	 A	seems	to	 fail	 in	achieving	all	of	 the	objectives	of	 the	class	action	mechanism.	In	contrast,	although	the	Common	Law	Type	and	Civil	Law	Type	B	appear	to	be	more	favorable	options,	they	exhibit	some	deficiencies.	In	the	Common	Law	Type,	the	problems	of	attorney	fee	abuses	and	frivolous	lawsuits	have	imposed	social	costs	on	the	public	 by	 entrepreneurial	 lawyers	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 class	 actions.	Type	B	 still	 appears	 to	 have	 the	 issues	 of	 not	 providing	 enough	access	 to	 justice	 in	 class	 disputes	 when	 resources	 are	 limited,	which	diminishes	the	other	functions	offered	by	class	actions.	These	unsolved	problems	in	the	Common	Law	Type	and	Type	B	 of	 class	 actions	 imply	 the	 issue	 of	 contract	 failure.	 Contract	failure,	 as	 described	 by	 Hansmann,	 “is	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 problem	 if	consumers	 seek	 to	 purchase	 public	 goods/service	 from	 profit-seeking	producers.”76	The	literature	indicates	that	class	actions	do	reflect	to	some	extent	the	public	good	and	public	policy	because:	(1)	it	takes	longer	to	resolve	class	actions	than	most	other	types	of	litigation	 and	 (2)	 class	 actions	 require	 the	 court	 to	 play	 a	more	active	monitoring	 role.77	In	 class	 actions,	 regardless	 of	 whether	they	 are	 injunctive	 suits	 or	 damage	 suits,	 the	 benefited	 parties	usually	go	far	beyond	the	party	that	brings	the	suit,	which	echoes	the	viewpoint	that	“the	efficiency	in	private	enforcement	is	not	the	same	as	efficiency	in	producing	the	social	utility	of	enforcement.”78	
B.	Suggested	Solutions	When	 facing	 contract	 failure	 problems,	 academics	 suggest	that	NPOs	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 the	more	 suitable	 suppliers.79	This	 is	
 76.	 Henry	 B.	 Hansmann,	 The	 Role	 of	 Nonprofit	 Enterprise,	 89	 YALE	 L.	 J.	 835,	 849	(1980).	See	generally	RICHARD	A.	MUSGRAVE	&	PEGGY	B.	MUSGRAVE,	PUBLIC	FINANCE	IN	THEORY	AND	PRACTICE	(1976)	(noting	that	public	goods	means	it	costs	no	more	to	provide	the	good	to	many	persons	than	it	does	to	provide	to	one	person	because	one	person’s	enjoyment	of	the	good	does	not	interfere	with	the	ability	of	others	to	enjoy	it	at	the	same	time;	second,	once	the	good	has	been	provided	to	one	person,	there	is	no	way	to	prevent	others	from	consuming	it).	77.	 See	Coffee,	Jr.,	supra	note	44,	at	1534.	78.	 See	Wang	&	Chen,	supra	note	34.	79.	 Hansmann,	supra	note	76,	at	838.	
2020]	 CLASS	ACTION	MECHANISMS	 1185	because,	 in	 contrast	 to	 profit-driven	 lawyers,	 NPOs,	 by	 nature,	prohibit	 the	 distribution	 of	 profits	 –	 the	 “non-distribution	constraint,”	 which	 makes	 an	 NPO	 lack	 the	 incentive	 to	 exploit	consumer	welfare.80	Hence,	an	NPO	is	a	better	institutional	design	“for	 solving	 the	 contract-failure	 problem	 in	 the	 production	 of	public	goods	and	services.”81	However,	 non-profit	 organizations	 will	 not	 voluntarily	address	 contract/market	 failure	 and	 provide	 support	 for	 class	actions,82	similar	 to	 the	previously	 identified	 issue	of	 inadequate	enforcement	 problem	 with	 Type	 B.	 This	 justifies	 government	intervention,	which	mandates	 that	market	participants	 establish	NPOs	or	GSOs	to	fulfill	the	need	for	law	enforcement.83	Meanwhile,	there	might	be	concerns	about	whether	using	GSOs	or	NPOs	will	reduce	 the	benefits	 of	 advocacy	 systems.84	In	 theory,	 only	when	information	collectors	are	 the	 “judge	and	 the	party”	at	 the	same	time	will	this	type	of	problem	arise.85	The	Author	believe	that	Civil	Law	Type	B	could	be	exempt	from	this	problem	because	GSOs	or	NPOs	are	still	advocates	as	long	as	they	are	independent	from	any	of	 the	 parties	 in	 the	 proceedings.	 Additionally,	 although	 non-profits	 might	 be	 expected	 to	 operate	 less	 efficiently	 than	 for-profits,86	the	disparity	in	behavior	is	not	overwhelming	if	proper	legal	restraints	or	monitoring	devices	are	applied.87	Another	possible	criticism	might	be	that	government	support	may	 undermine	 the	 independence	 of	 NPOs	 or	 GSOs	 because	 of	potential	 financial	 connections	 and	 political	 intervention. 88	However,	 this	 concern	 could	 be	 solved	 by	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	independence	from	finance	and	politics,	where	NPOs	or	GSOs	will	
 80.	 Id.	81.	 Yu-Hsin	Lin,	Modeling	Securities	Class	Actions	Outside	the	United	States:	The	Role	
of	Non-Profit	In	The	Case	of	Taiwan,	4	N.Y.U.	J.	L	&	BUS.	143,	186	(2007).	82.	 Lester	M.	Salamon,	Partners	in	Public	Service:	Government-nonprofit	Relations	in	the	Modern	Welfare	State	35-36	(1995).	83.	 Id.	84.	 Dewaterpont	&	Tirole,	supra	note	59.	85.	 See	Rosenfield,	supra	note	57.	86 .	 See	 Armen	 A.	 Alchian	 &	 Harold	 Demsetz,	 Production,	 Information	 Costs,	 and	
Economic	Organization,	62	AM.	ECON.	REV.	777,	790	(1972).	87 .	 See	 Hansmann,	 supra	 note	 76.	 For	 example,	 state	 corporation	 law	 commonly	makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 entrepreneurs	 to	 take	 stock	 in	 firms	 they	 create	 as	 a	 means	 of	providing	compensation	for	their	future	services.	88.	 Michael	 Lipsky	&	 Steven	Rathgeb	 Smith,	Nonprofit	Organizations,	 Government,	
and	the	Welfare	State,	104	POL.	SCI.	Q.	625,	629	(1989).	
1186	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	be	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 exempt	 from	 interventions	 from	 the	government.	Currently,	Germany,	 Japan,	Korea,	and	Taiwan	have	adopted	this	type	of	class	action	mechanism.89	Relevant	issues	in	the	ensuing	practice	are	worth	observing	and	further	study.	Based	 on	 previous	 studies	 and	 an	 economic	 analysis,	 this	Essay	presents	a	comparative	economic	analysis	of	the	major	types	of	 class	 actions	 and	 group	 litigation	 at	 the	 global	 level.	 Making	comparisons	of	the	different	legal	systems	is	a	great	challenge,	and	the	 Author	 believes	 there	 is	 no	 perfect	 model	 that	 can	 fully	illustrate	 every	 feature	 of	 all	 of	 the	 systems.	 However,	 it	 is	 still	important	 to	 take	 this	 first	 attempt	 to	 provide	 information	 as	 a	preliminary	picture	of	an	economic	analysis	of	“class	action	family	trees,”	which	is	important	for	transnational	litigation,	recognition,	and	 enforcement.	 Additionally,	 it	may	provide	 some	 insights	 for	countries,	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 backgrounds	 and	 needs,	 to	choose	or	to	conduct	reform	regarding	class	dispute	resolution.		
 89.	 See	Lin,	supra	note	81.	
